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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Juan Carlos Maldonado appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdicts 
finding him guilty of felony domestic battery and of being a persistent violator.  On appeal, 
Maldonado argues (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting statements the 
victim made during medical examinations by a paramedic and (later) a Physician’s 
Assistant, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial after the state 
mistakenly gained admission of, and published to the jury, an unredacted version of the 
victim’s recorded statements to police in which she said Maldonado had been in prison 
before, and (3) even if the errors he alleges are deemed individually harmless, the 
cumulative effect of the errors warrants reversal. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Maldonado with domestic battery – traumatic injury (felony) and 
with being a persistent violator.  (R., pp.37-40.)  Maldonado pled not guilty and the case 
proceeded to trial.  (R., pp.41, 78-103, 106-116.)  At the conclusion of the trial, the jury 
found Maldonado guilty of both the charge and the enhancement.  (R., pp.117-119.)  The 
district court sentenced Maldonado to a unified sentence of 20 years with six years fixed.  
(R., pp.154-155.)  Maldonado filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which was 
denied.  (R., pp.175-177; 8/29/17 Order Denying Rule 35 Motion.)  Maldonado timely 
appealed.  (R., pp.165-167, 191-195.) 
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ISSUES 
 
Maldonado states the issues on appeal as: 
 
I. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed hearsay 
statements regarding the identity of Ms. Maldonado’s assailant to be 
admitted? 
 
II. Did the district court err in denying the motion for a mistrial made 
after the State played an audio in which Ms. Maldonado told law 
enforcement that Mr. Maldonado had previously been in prison for 
a long time? 
 
III. Even if the above errors are individually harmless, was Mr. 
Maldonado’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law 
violated because the accumulation of errors deprived him of his right 
to a fair trial? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.3.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1.  Has Maldonado failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by admitting 
statements the victim made during medical examinations to the paramedic and the 
Physician’s Assistant identifying Maldonado as the assailant? 
 
2.  Has Maldonado failed to show that the district court erred in denying his motion for a 
mistrial? 
 
3.  Has Maldonado failed to show cumulative error? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
Maldonado Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Admitting Statements The Victim Made To The Paramedic And The Physician’s 
Assistant Identifying Maldonado As The Assailant 
 
A. Introduction 
 Maldonado argues that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the state 
to introduce, during its opening statement and case-in-chief, statements by the victim 
(Maldonado’s wife, Nellie)1 to a treating paramedic (Haley Glenn) and a treating 
Physician’s Assistant (David Nelson) that identified Maldonado as the person who battered 
her.  As he did below, Maldonado contends that, contrary to I.R.E. 803(4), the identity of 
the person who inflicted Nellie’s injuries was not “reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or 
treatment,” and, therefore, the challenged statements were inadmissible hearsay.  
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.4-18.)   
Maldonado’s argument fails.  Idaho’s appellate courts have not specifically 
determined whether the identity of a perpetrator is, or can be, “reasonably pertinent to 
diagnosis or treatment” under I.R.E. 803(4).  However, a review of the record and of the 
generally applicable law supports the trial court’s determination that the challenged 
statements were reasonably pertinent to the medical diagnosis and treatment of Nellie, and 
admissible under I.R.E. 803(4).  Even assuming the trial court abused its discretion in 
admitting the challenged “identification” portions of Nellie’s statements, any such error 
was harmless and did not affect Maldonado’s substantial rights. 
 
 
                                            
1  At trial, Nellie denied that Maldonado was the person who battered her.   (11/18/16 Tr., 
p.56, Ls.13-17; p.60, L.21 – p.61, L.5; p.67, Ls.2-5.)  
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B. Standard Of Review 
 
 A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is generally reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion.  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 218, 245 P.3d 961, 970 (2010); State v. 
Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009).  In reviewing a discretionary decision, 
the appellate court “examine[s] whether:  (1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as 
discretionary; (2) the trial court acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and with 
applicable legal standards: and (3) the trial court reached its decision through an exercise 
of reason.”  Id. (citations omitted); accord State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 
P.3d 582, 590 (2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 
C. Maldonado Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Permitting The State To Present Nellie’s Statements To The Paramedic And The 
Physician’s Assistant Identifying Him As Her Assailant  
 
 Prior to jury selection, the prosecutor informed the trial court that he intended to 
“introduce evidence that the victim told two separate medical providers about her injuries 
and who injured her[,]” pursuant to I.R.E. 803(4) as “statements made for the purposes of 
medical diagnosis or treatment.”  (11/17/16 Tr., p.14, L.20 – p.15, L.2.)  Maldonado has 
failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting those statements under 
I.R.E. 803(4).   
Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at 
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”  I.R.E. 
801(c). Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible.  I.R.E. 802.  However, I.R.E. 803(4) 
specifically excepts from the hearsay rule statements made for purposes of medical 
diagnosis or treatment.  Specifically, the rule provides that the following are not excluded 
by the hearsay rule, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness: 
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Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.  Statements 
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical 
history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the source 
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 
 
I.R.E. 803(4). 
 The rationale behind this firmly-rooted hearsay exception is that statements made 
for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment are “generally trustworthy because the 
declarant is motivated by a desire to receive proper medical treatment and will therefore 
be truthful in giving pertinent information to the physician.”  State v. Nelson, 131 Idaho 
210, 215, 953 P.2d 650, 655 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing State v. Kay, 129 Idaho 507, 518, 927 
P.2d 897, 908 (Ct. App. 1996)).  This is especially true where, as here, the hearsay declarant 
is an adult.  In such cases, “the motive to speak the truth to a physician in order to advance 
a self-interest in obtaining proper medical care for the declarant or another is generally 
assumed.”  Kay, 129 Idaho at 518, 927 P.2d at 908. 
 In order to qualify as a statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment, admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 803(4), the out-of-court statement(s) sought to be 
introduced must meet three foundational requirements:   
The proponent must show:  (1) that the statements were “made for purposes 
of medical diagnosis or treatment”; (2) that the statements described 
“medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the 
source thereof”; and (3) that the statements were “reasonably pertinent to 
diagnosis or treatment.” 
 
Kay, 129 Idaho at 518, 927 P.2d at 908.  See also Nelson, 131 Idaho at 216, 953 P.2d at 
656.  So long as there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that these foundational 
requisites have been satisfied, the trial court’s decision to admit a statement as one made 
for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment will not be disturbed on appeal.  Nelson, 
131 Idaho at 215-16, 953 P.2d at 655-56; Kay, 129 Idaho at 518-19, 927 P.2d at 908-09.  
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 Applying these principles in this case, it is clear that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in allowing Paramedic Glenn and Physician’s Assistant Nelson to testify 
about Nellie’s identification of Maldonado as her assailant.     
 
1. Nellie’s Statement To Paramedic Haley Glenn   
 After jury selection, the prosecutor advised the trial court that he wanted to tell the 
jury in his opening statement that, after the EMT (Haley Glenn) “asked Nellie what 
happened[,]” Nellie “told her significant other had punched her multiple times in the head.”  
(11/17/16 Tr., p.217, Ls.8-12 (emphasis added).)  In ruling on the state’s request, the court 
explained that the identification of the perpetrator was “intertwined with the statement[,]” 
that it “may or may not be pertinent to their diagnosis[,]” but that “it also becomes one of 
those facts that’s inescapable.  It’s not like a separate series of things that occurred.”2  
(11/17/16 Tr., p.222, L.25 – p.223, L.7.)  The court permitted the state to “make that 
comment during opening statement[,]” and noted Maldonado’s standing objection to the 
state’s request.  (11/17/16 Tr., p.223, Ls.10-18.)   
                                            
2  On the second day of trial, the trial court further explained how Nellie “relayed this 
information to EMT Glenn,[,]” stating: 
 
[Nellie had] been waken [sic] up in the morning by her boyfriend 
leaving.  They’d been arguing.  The argument escalated, it became physical 
and he began punching her in the face and torso. 
 
It appears to me the identity of the perpetrator in that presentation to 
the EMT is so intertwined with the patient’s description of events . . . . 
. . . . 
And therefore, the reliability of that statement doesn’t appear to be 
a basis to separate that, because it seems to be intertwined with the 
information that’s being collected.”  
 
(11/18/16 Tr., p.14, L.22 – p.15, L.16.)    
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During opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury:  “[Haley Glenn] asked 
Nellie what happened.  And Nellie said her significant other that morning had punched her 
repeatedly in the face and hit her in the ribs.”  (11/17/16 Tr., p.249, Ls.11-14.)   
At trial, Ms. Glenn testified that on the morning of May 31, 2016, she was working 
as a Canyon County Paramedic when she responded to a Nampa residence and, after 
waiting about 46 minutes before making contact with anyone at the scene, she went inside 
and saw Nellie sitting on a couch in the living room.  (11/17/16 Tr., p.319, L.11 – p.321, 
L.20.)  Nellie had bruising on both sides of her face and the bridge of her nose, and her lip 
was swollen.  (11/17/16 Tr., p.322, Ls.6-10.)   Ms. Glenn testified that when she asked 
Nellie what happened, Nellie said “her significant other had woken her up, got into an 
argument with her.  It escalated, became physical in nature and went from there for about 
30 minutes.”  (11/17/16 Tr., p.322, L.14 – p.323, L.5.)   Ms. Glenn further testified: 
 She told me that her significant other had woken her up and began 
arguing with her. About what, I do not know.  But that the argument 
escalated and became physical and he began punching her in the face and 
the torso. 
 
(11/17/16 Tr., p.324, Ls.12-16.)  The paramedics transported Nellie to a hospital by 
ambulance.  (11/17/16 Tr., p.325, Ls.15-18.)   
Although Ms. Glenn testified on direct examination that Nellie said her “significant 
other” had battered her (11/17/16 Tr., p.324, Ls.9-16), on cross-examination she clarified 
that Nellie actually used the term “boyfriend,” and that she (Ms. Glenn) wrote “significant 
other” in her report because she felt “like it painted a better picture[,]” and to her, 
“[s]ignificant other . . . is boyfriend.”  (11/17/16 Tr., p.329, L.7 – p.330, L.1.)   Ms. Glenn 
also denied that the identity of the person who battered Nellie was necessary for medical 
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diagnosis or treatment, and agreed that “just primarily . . . the mechanism of injury” was 
necessary for that purpose.  (11/17/16 Tr., p.328, Ls.16-22.) 
Despite the fact that Ms. Glenn’s testimony did not provide a foundation for 
concluding that the identity of the perpetrator was reasonably pertinent to Nellie’s medical 
diagnosis or treatment, the district court correctly concluded that the perpetrator’s identity 
was intertwined with those portions of Nellie’s statement that were pertinent to those 
purposes and “becomes one of those facts that’s inescapable,”3 “not like a separate series 
of things that occurred.”  (11/17/16 Tr., p.222, L.25 – p.223, L.7.)   
As the trial court surmised, segregating the identification portion of Nellie’s 
statement from the rest of her statement to Ms. Glenn would have been problematic.  
Nellie’s statement that she was woken up out of her sleep and punched repeatedly during 
an argument that ensued would have made it implausible to conceal the fact that 
Maldonado was the only other person with her at the time:  Nellie testified that she and 
Maldonado had been staying together in the downstairs of the house a couple of days before 
the incident, and got into an argument after he woke her up that morning; Maldonado told 
Detective Wilber he was with Nellie on the morning of the incident, he told the women 
who came downstairs to intervene in the argument that they should stay out of it, and he 
was angry when he argued with Nellie.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.55, L.21 – p.57, L.24; p.140, L.17 
– p.141, L.10; see generally State’s Ex. 6.)  Any attempt to omit the obvious identity of the 
perpetrator from Nellie’s statement would have been impractical and pointless.   
                                            
3  The recorded statements of Miriam Murillo and Janell Ozuna (State Exhibits. 22, 24), 
admitted as substantive evidence under I.R.E. 804(b)(5), leave little doubt that Maldonado 
was the person who battered Nellie early on the morning of May 31, 2016.  (See section C, 
infra, for a more detailed discussion of statements by Ms. Murillo and Ms. Ozuna.)   
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Maldonado has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in allowing 
Ms. Glenn to testify about Nellie’s identification of the person who battered her.   
  
2. Nellie’s Statement To Physician’s Assistant David Nelson 
After Nellie was transported to the hospital on May 31, 2016, Physician’s Assistant 
David Nelson assessed and treated her injuries.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.41, L.21 – p.42, L.7.)  
During his opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury that the Physician’s Assistant is 
“going to tell you what Nellie told him had occurred[,]” but the prosecutor did not tell the 
jury at that point that Nellie identified Maldonado as her assailant.  (11/17/16 Tr., p.249, 
Ls.14-21.)  At the start of the second day of trial, Maldonado’s attorney’s told the court he 
anticipated that the state was going to admit evidence of “who the assailant was” through 
Mr. Nelson’s testimony about what Nellie told him, and that he would object to such 
testimony.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.10, Ls.14-21.)  After the prosecutor confirmed that he was 
going to present such testimony, the court (at the request of defense counsel) allowed the 
prosecutor to lay a foundation for Mr. Nelson to testify about why Nellie’s identification 
of Maldonado was related to her medical diagnosis or treatment.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.10, L. 
23 – p.11, L.10.)   
In relevant part, Mr. Nelson testified outside the presence of the jury that:  (1) he 
uses the “SOAP” method to assess patients, which stands for “subjective objective 
assessment and plan” (11/18/16 Tr., p.17, Ls.17-21; p.28, L.19 – p.29, L.5); (2) during the 
“subjective” portion of the patient assessment he asks open-ended questions such as “What 
brings you in today?” and writes down what the patient says (id., p.17, Ls.20-24; p.20, 
Ls.21-23); (3) it is important to know whether it was a man or a woman who assaulted a 
patient because of the need to know how large the person was who inflicted the injury (id., 
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p.19, Ls.22-24; p.19, Ls.5-9; p.22, Ls.7-19); (4) if mentioned by the patient, the identity of 
the perpetrator is something  he would write down in the medical chart so “the next provider 
can read and say, oh, this is how these injuries were sustained” (id., p.25, Ls.2-19); and (5) 
he agreed “it would be pertinent to write that it was her husband, because some later 
physician may read this, see additional injuries, look back at this, see evidence of abuse in 
the past” (id., p.26, Ls.4-10).     
The trial court ruled that the state could present the “identity” portion of Nellie’s 
statement to Mr. Nelson, explaining that once the patient responds to the open-ended 
questioning during the subjective phase of the assessment, the Physician’s Assistant 
“glean[s] what is pertinent from what the patient says.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.29, Ls.7-17.)  The 
court explained that determining whether the assailant was a man, woman, or child “is 
pertinent to [the] evaluation.”4  (11/18/16 Tr., p.29, Ls.12-17.)  The court also stated that 
Nellie’s identification of Maldonado as the assailant was “intertwined with the statement 
made for medical diagnosis,” which, as discussed above with regard to Ms. Glenn’s 
testimony, was well-founded.   (11/18/16 Tr., p.30, Ls.13-15.)   
Further, although the trial court did not mention it in its ruling, it should nonetheless 
be considered that, according to Mr. Nelson, the identity of the assailant was pertinent to 
Nellie’s medical diagnosis or treatment so that a “later physician may read [it], see 
additional injuries, [and] look back at this, [and] see evidence of abuse in the past.”  
(11/18/16 Tr., p.26, Ls.4-10.)  See State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho 383, 388, 234 P.3d 707, 712 
(2010) (affirming denial of motion on correct theory, one not reached by trial court); 
                                            
4  According to Mr. Nelson, knowing the size of an assailant is important for understanding 
the “mechanism of their injuries.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.19, Ls.18-24; p.22, Ls.14-19.)   
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McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999) (if trial court reaches 
the correct result by erroneous theory, appellate court will affirm upon the correct theory).   
 The trial court was correct.  Mr. Nelson‘s foundational testimony established that                     
the identity of the person who battered Nellie was “reasonably pertinent to [her] diagnosis 
and treatment.”  Kay, 129 Idaho at 518, 927 P.2d at 908.  Because the challenged statement 
was made for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment, the district court properly 
admitted it pursuant to I.R.E. 803(4).5   
 
D. Even If The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Admitting The Challenged 
Statements, The Error Was Harmless 
 
 Even if a trial court has abused its discretion, such “abuse of discretion may be 
deemed harmless if a substantial right is not affected.  In the case of an incorrect ruling 
regarding evidence, this Court will grant relief on appeal only if the error affects a 
substantial right of one of the parties.”  Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363, 247 P.3d at 590 
(citation omitted).  See also State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 420, 224 P.3d 485, 487 (2009) 
(“Unless an error affects a substantial right of a party, the error does not constitute grounds 
for reversal.” (Citation omitted)). 
Here, assuming the district court abused its discretion in admitting one or both of 
the Nellie’s statements to Paramedic Glenn and Physician’s Assistant Nelson, the error did 
not affect Maldonado’s substantial rights.  First, Maldonado’s defense completely centered 
on Nellie’s extensive testimony that her “boyfriend” Victor battered her the night before, 
and that, in order to protect Victor, she initially blamed Maldonado for her injuries.  
                                            
5  During his trial testimony, Mr. Nelson told the jury that Nellie said she was assaulted by 
her “husband” early in the morning in her home, and that he punched her several times in 
the face and chest.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.44, Ls.17-25; p.48, L.15 – p.49, L.11.)   
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(11/18/16 Tr., p.58, Ls.3-14; p.64, L.6 – p.65, L.11; p.70, L.25 – p.71, L.10; p.72, Ls.12-
21; p.75, L.6 – p.77, L.7.)  Regardless of any error in its admission, Ms. Glenn’s testimony 
that Nellie said that the person who battered her was her “boyfriend” was totally supportive 
of Maldonado’s defense.  (See 11/17/16 Tr., p.329, L.7 – p.330, L.1.)    
 As discussed, Maldonado told Detective Wilber he was with Nellie on the morning 
of the incident and they were arguing when the two women tried to intervene.  He told the 
women they should stay out of it, and he was angry with Nellie at the time because she 
would not account for her facial injuries.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.55, L.21 – p.57, L.24; p.140, 
L.17 – p.141, L.10; see generally State’s Ex. 6.)  Nellie testified to the underlying facts that 
Maldonado woke her up at 5:00 a.m. that morning, and that Janell and Jeanette (Miriam 
Murrilo) came downstairs to the door as Maldonado yelled at Nellie and told her to stop 
lying about her boyfriend.6  (11/18/16 Tr., p.7, Ls.5-8; p.57, L.9 – p.58, L.5.)   
Also incriminating are Maldonado’s jail calls to Nellie and the recorded statements 
of Miriam Murillo and Janell Ozuna.   
 
1. First Jail Call 
A close approximation of the most relevant parts of the first jail call from 
Maldonado to Nellie, made on May 31, 2016, the day of the crime, is as follows: 
Maldonado: I told them that you came home all crushed up and that’s 
why we were arguing, because someone had texted you . . . 
but you wouldn’t tell me . . . .  (St. Ex. 1, 00:25-00:42) 
 
                                            
6  However, Nellie further testified, contrary to her statements to law enforcement and the 
Physician’s Assistant, that her facial injuries were inflicted by her boyfriend Victor the 
night before, stating, “when [Maldonado] had woke up . . . he seen my face and he was 
pissed.  He wanted to go after this guy.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.58, Ls.7-9.)    
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Nellie: Oh, Carlos, show them, okay?  You need to fucking show 
them that you have some sort of fucking remorse and you 
need help Carlos. 
 
Maldonado: I told them . . . . 
 
Nellie: If you don’t and you fight, if you fight this . . . .  (St. Ex. 1, 
00:55-1:00.) 
 
Maldonado: I told them I needed help man, I told them, I told them that I 
need help . . . I promise you I did dude, But I didn’t fucking 
tell them that I [. . .] that shit man.  (St. Ex. 1, 01:13-01:25.) 
 
Nellie: You did?  (St. Ex. 1, 01:26.) 
 
Maldonado: . . .  I didn’t tell them I did that shit to you.  (St. Ex. 1, 01:29-
01:31.) 
 
Nellie:  I told them that we both needed help and that you weren’t 
like this. You are not like this.  (St. Ex. 1, 01:48-01:54.)   
 
At the end of the call, Maldonado said “sorry babe” and “I’m so sorry.”  (St. Ex. 1, 03:44-
04:05.)   
In short, at the same time Maldonado was rehearsing a story to exculpate himself 
in the courtroom, he was tacitly admitting that he battered Nellie by apologizing to her and 
agreeing that he needed help.    
  
2. Second Jail Call 
In a second call from jail to Nellie on May 31, 2016, Maldonado asked what she 
had said, and she told him that she did not tell “them” anything and that he “fucked [her] 
up good.”  (St. Ex. 2, 00:25-00:33; 11/18/16 Tr., p.224, L.19 – p.225, L.3.)  After discussing 
who had called the police that morning, Maldonado asked Nellie what she had said, and 
she replied that she told them she did not want to talk to them right now, that they both 
needed to get help, and she didn’t want him “to go to prison or anything like that.”  (St. Ex. 
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2, 01:03-01:26.)  When Nellie asked Maldonado if he told them anything, he said he told 
them he had been sick in bed, and that she had been in and out of the house, and when she 
came back later on that night . . . “(inaudible) . . . oh shit man.”  (St. Ex. 2, 01:45-02:12.)  
Nellie immediately cut Maldonado off, saying, “babe, you can’t, listen,” and then the phone 
call timed out.  (St. Ex. 2, 02:13-02:15.)   
Plainly, the primary purpose of the second phone call was to make sure that Nellie’s 
version of the events coincided with Maldonado’s.    
 
3. Third Jail Call 
One week prior to trial, on November 10, 2016, Maldonado made another call from 
jail to Nellie.  (See St. Ex. 3.)  Nellie told Maldonado, “that fucking Janell got fucking 
served,” and when he asked what that meant, she said that she did not know.  (St. Ex. 3, 
01:20-01:27.)  Maldonado told Nellie, “They don’t got to go, you know that, right? They 
don’t get in trouble . . . hear me?  (St. Ex. 3, 01:30-01:37.)  Nellie said, “I keep telling them, 
they’re all fucking retarded, man,” and Maldonado replied, “Well, you better stop telling 
them and fucking start making them . . . nothing happens to ‘em babe, they get threatened 
and threatened and threatened and nothing happens; that’s all that happens, it’s not a 
charge, its nothing.”  (St. Ex. 3, 01:38-02:06.)  Nellie said “okay.”  (St. Ex. 3, 02:12.)    
Based on the third phone call, the trial court ruled, pursuant to I.R.E. 804(b)(5), that 
Maldonado “engaged in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the 
unavailability of [Janell Ozuna and Miriam Murillo] as [witnesses][,]” and therefore 
allowed the absent witness’s recorded statements to be admitted as substantive evidence at 
trial.  (See generally 11/18/16 Tr., p.96, L.21 – p.104, L.6.)    
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4. Fourth Jail Call 
In a fourth jail call from Maldonado to Nellie, made on November 12, 2016, Nellie 
said she had seen Janell Ozuna that morning, and asked Maldonado if it would be better if 
she did go (presumably to the trial), and he said “yes.”  (St. Ex. 25, 00:18-00:25.)  When 
Maldonado told Nellie that “they’re gonna dissect her,” she said that she would not tell her 
to go.  (St. Ex. 25, 00:48-01:05.)  Maldonado explained that if she did not go, “then no 
eyewitness, comprende?” (Nellie interjected that she understood), and “because of her shit 
. . . her testimony, her statement, audio . . . that’s gonna fuck, but if she goes and tell ‘em I 
was scared, this is what really happened and this is the reason why I said all that, uh, then 
that dismisses all that and I get off.”  (St. Ex. 25, 01:06-01:43.)  Nellie agreed, and 
Maldonado told her about another domestic violence case in which the defendant’s “old 
lady got smart,” and because she did not testify, “no witness, no fucking charge.”  (St. Ex. 
25, 01:45-02:05.)  Nellie responded, “I told you that from the fucking beginning and you 
wouldn’t fucking listen to me man . . . I knew that, I fucking knew that!”  (St. Ex. 25, 
02:06-02:16.)   After further discussing his options on what to tell the two witnesses, 
Maldonado said, “It’s okay . . . as long as they detract their shit, palabras,[7] then everything 
will be okay, baby, okay?”  (St. Ex. 25, 02:40-02:51.)   
As in the third jail call, Maldonado’s fourth call attempts to undermine the judicial 
process by making sure that Janell Ozuna either retracts her statements to law enforcement, 
or simply fails to show up for trial.  Significantly, Maldonado said that if Janell did not go 
                                            
7  Joanna Torres, a Canyon County Victim Witness Coordinator, testified that she speaks 
and understands Spanish and that the word “palabras” means “words.”  (11/18/16 Tr., 
p.238, L.12 – p.239, L.11; p.243, L.25 – p.244, L.11.)  
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to the trial, there would be no “eyewitness” – an indication that he considered Janell an 
eyewitness to his – not Victor’s – commission of the crime.     
 
5. Miriam Murillo’s Statement As Substantive Evidence   
Miriam (Jeanette) Murillo testified through her recorded statement to Detective 
Wilber (as substantive evidence) that Nellie had been living at Janell’s house for two to 
three weeks, and that Maldonado had been staying there a couple of days before the May 
31, 2016 incident.  (St. Ex. 24, 02:30-02:50.)  Miriam and her son stayed on one side of a 
false wall of a room in the downstairs area, and Nellie and Maldonado stayed on the other 
side of the wall.   (St. Ex. 24, 01:20-01:09.)  When Miriam got up to go to the bathroom at 
about 5:00 a.m., she heard Nellie crying and when she asked her if she was okay, 
Maldonado said, “get the fuck out of here.”  (St. Ex. 24, 04:50-6:00.)  Most significantly, 
Miriam heard a hitting or slapping noise two times, like skin on skin, followed by Nellie 
crying, and Maldonado telling Nellie to shut up.  (St. Ex. 24, 04:57-08:27; 11:00-11:25.)   
Miriam went upstairs and got Janell to go back downstairs with her.  (St. Ex. 24, 
11:25-11:30.)  Maldonado told Janell there was nothing wrong and he was just talking to 
Nellie.  (St. Ex. 24,   07:20-07:25.)  When Janell asked Nellie if she was okay, Nellie told 
Janell, “don’t leave me alone.”  (St. Ex. 24, 06:20-07:00.)  
 
6. Janell Ozuna’s Statement As Substantive Evidence 
Janell Ozuna, the owner of the house, was woken up early in the morning on May 
31, 2016, by Miriam, who told her to “come quickly, he’s got a knife and he gonna hurt 
her.”  (St. Ex. 22, 00:20-00:49.)  When she got downstairs, she opened the curtain that hung 
in the room’s doorway and said “Carlos, come here please,” and he told her to leave him 
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alone, get away, and that he was going to hit her.  (St. Ex. 22, 00:50-01:28; 11/18/16 Tr., 
p.133, Ls.18-24.)  Maldonado told Nellie that she better tell him the truth.  (St. Ex. 22, 
01:27-01:40.)  Janell told Maldonado to “just come here,” and he told her to get out; this 
time he turned towards Janell and started walking to her, so she shut the curtain.  (St. Ex. 
22, 01:50-02:05.)  Janell saw that Maldonado held a knife with the blade exposed in his 
left hand.  (St. Ex. 22, 02:10-02:35.)   
  
7. Nellie’s Injuries And Demeanor 
Nellie suffered obvious traumatic injury to her face, as evidence by close-up photos 
of her face that were admitted at trial.8  (See State’s Exhibits 13, 14, and 15.)  Although, 
Physician Assistant Nelson testified that Nellie did not have any broken bones, her injuries 
were serious enough to cause her to undergo two CT scans (one to determine if there was 
any cranial bleeding, another to see if there were “any fractures or processes” to her facial 
bones), and she was physically examined to determine if any of her ribs were broken.  
(11/18/16 Tr., p.46, L.12 – p.47, L.19.)  Mr. Nelson explained that the swelling around 
Nellie’s eyes was “impressive,” meaning that (on a rating from mild, moderate, severe or 
impressive), “in this case, walk in the room and it’s obvious from across the room that 
there’s swelling in the area.”    (11/18/16 Tr., p.47, L.20 – p.48, L.7.) 
Captain Curt Shankel testified that, after responding to the house, he found Nellie 
behind a door to the downstairs laundry room crying, apparently frightened, “just making 
                                            
8  The distinct element between felony domestic violence and misdemeanor domestic 
battery is the infliction of a traumatic injury.  Compare I.C. § 18-918(2)(a) with I.C. § 18-
918(3)(b).  “‘Traumatic injury’ means a condition of the body, such as a wound or external 
or internal injury, whether of a minor or serious nature, caused by physical force.”  I.C. 
§ 18-918(1)(b).  There is no question that Nellie suffered a traumatic injury. 
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herself small,” and “[s]he had the hands up and was shaking.”9   (11/17/16 Tr., p.289, L.24 
– p.290, L.8; p.294, Ls.2-7.)   When the Captain reached out to her and asked her to come 
out, “she just stayed there.”  (11/17/16 Tr., p.294, Ls.11-14.)  Corporal Tonna Marek also 
went to the residence and described Nellie as “crying, shaking, [and] extremely fearful.”  
(11/17/16 Tr., p.305, Ls.10-15; see also St. Ex. 4 (Corporal Marek’s video recording of her 
contact with Nellie at the residence).)   
 
8. Summary 
In light of the trial testimony, as outlined above, there is no reasonable possibility 
that the challenged statements (i.e., Nellie’s statements to the paramedic and Physician’s 
Assistant identifying the batterer) affected the outcome of Maldonado’s trial.  If there was 
error, it was harmless.       
 
II. 
The Statement By Nellie About Maldonado Having Been In Prison Did Not Constitute 
Reversible Error Because It Did Not Deprive Maldonado Of A Fair Trial 
 
A. Introduction  
During trial, the state inadvertently admitted and published a tape-recorded 
interview of Nellie by Detective Marang in which she said that Maldonado had been “in 
prison for a long time,” and “in prison . . . state of mind where you don’t like to be 
disrespected.”  (St. Ex. 23, 05:30-05:45.)  Maldonado moved for a mistrial (11/18/16 Tr., 
p.127, Ls.9-10), which was denied by the trial court (11/18/16 Tr., p.169, Ls.5-7).  On 
                                            
9  Nellie’s mother, Ysabel Castro, had received a text message from another daughter that 
alarmed her, and she called 911 before driving to the Nampa residence where Nellie was 
staying, and the police had already arrived.  (11/17/16 Tr., p.258, L.5 – p. 263, L.22.) 
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appeal, Maldonado contends the trial court committed reversible error in denying his 
motion.  Maldonado’s argument fails.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
  
The standard of review applicable to the denial of a motion for mistrial is well 
established.  State v. Ruiz, 159 Idaho 722, 724, 366 P.3d 644, 646 (Ct. App. 2015).   
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised 
his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion 
was made.  Rather, the question must be whether the event which 
precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible error when 
viewed in the context of the full record.  Thus, where a motion for mistrial 
has been denied in a criminal case, the “abuse of discretion” standard is a 
misnomer.  The standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible error.  
Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that 
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge’s refusal to declare a mistrial 
will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted 
reversible error. 
 
Id. (citing State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Ct. App. 1983)).  “An 
error is harmless, not necessitating reversal, if the reviewing court is able to declare beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.”  Id. (citing State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010); State v. Watkins, 152 Idaho 764, 766, 274 
P.3d 1279, 1281 (Ct. App. 2012)).    
  
C. Factual Background 
The statement from Nellie to Detective Marang about Maldonado having been in 
prison does not constitute reversible error.  “A mistrial may be declared on motion of the 
defendant when there occurs during the trial, either inside or outside the courtroom, an 
error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct that is prejudicial to the defendant and 
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deprives the defendant of a fair trial.”  I.C.R. 29.1.  The statement made by Nellie did not 
deprive Maldonado of a fair trial.  I.C.R. 29.1. 
Although the prosecutor had prepared a redacted version of Nellie’s interview 
which omitted her reference to prison (see St. Ex. 5), he inadvertently gained admission 
(through Detective Marang’s testimony) of Nellie’s unredacted taped interview (see St. Ex. 
23) and published it to the jury over Maldonado’s “hearsay” objection.  (11/18/16 Tr., 
p.119, L.15 – p.121, L.16; p.127, Ls.20-23; p.154, Ls.10-15.)  After Detective Marang was 
excused, Maldonado’s attorney informed the court that “in the audio [Nellie] makes 
reference [that] Carlos spent time in prison and that he felt, you know, disrespected[,]” and 
requested a mistrial.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.126, L.21 – p.127, L.10.)  The trial judge said that he 
had not heard that comment when it was first published, but when the issue was taken up 
again later during the jury’s lunch break, the court replayed State’s Exhibit 23 and heard 
Nellie say, in effect, “He’s been in prison for a long time and he doesn’t like the disrespect.”  
(11/18/16 Tr., p.150, L.17 – p.151, L.22.)   
After protracted discussion and argument, the trial court denied Maldonado’s 
mistrial motion (11/18/16 Tr., p.169, Ls.5-7), and instructed the jury as follows: 
In addition, portions of State’s Exhibit Number 23, an audio recording of 
Detective Marang’s interview with Nelida Maldonado, were played into the 
record also under the same limiting instructions by the Court. 
 
 However, because I have determined that that recording 
inadvertently contained information that is inadmissible, I am now ruling 
that the audio recording of Exhibit 23 is to be stricken from the record.  And 
you are instructed that you are to disregard anything you may have heard or 
understood from the Exhibit 23 audio recording of Nelida Maldonado.  
 
(11/18/16 Tr., p.175, L.25 – p.176, L.11.) 
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After five more witnesses testified, the state recalled Detective Marang, who 
testified that State’s Exhibit 5 was a recording of his taped interview with Nellie that had 
been redacted to conform with the court’s prior order (in regard to stricken St. Ex. 23), and 
agreed that he “heard some things that have been taken out.”  (11/18/16 Tr., p.245, L.15 – 
p.246, L.7.)  Maldonado’s counsel said he had “the same objection that I made previously,” 
which was a hearsay objection.  (11/18/16 Tr., p.119, Ls.15-18; p.246, Ls.11-15.)  The trial 
court admitted States Exhibit 5 into evidence with the admonition that it was being offered 
for statements made by Nellie that may not be consistent with her trial testimony.  (11/18/16 
Tr., p.246, L.16 – p.247, L.9.) 
 
D. The Statement By Nellie Did Not Constitute Reversible Error Because It Did Not 
Deprive Maldonado Of A Fair Trial 
 
“A mistrial may be declared, upon the defendant’s motion, if there has been an error 
or legal defect during the trial which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the 
defendant of a fair trial.”  State v. Dopp, 129 Idaho 597, 603, 930 P.2d 1039, 1045 (Ct. 
App. 1996) (citing I.C.R. 29.1); accord, e.g., Ruiz, 159 Idaho at 724, 366 P.3d at 646.  “The 
admission of improper evidence does not automatically require the declaration of a 
mistrial.”  Ruiz, 159 Idaho at 724, 366 P.3d at 646 (citing State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 631, 
97 P.3d 1014, 1020 (Ct. App. 2004)).  Rather, “[t]he core inquiry” when denial of a mistrial 
is challenged on appeal is “whether it appears from the record that the event triggering the 
mistrial motion contributed to the verdict, leaving the appellate court with a reasonable 
doubt that the jury would have reached the same result had the event not occurred.”  State 
v. Palin, 106 Idaho 70, 75, 675 P.2d 49, 54 (Ct. App. 1983).   
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 In conducting this inquiry, the appellate court “normally presume[s] that a jury will 
follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence.”  Watkins, 152 Idaho at 768, 274 
P.3d at 1283; accord Ruiz, 159 Idaho at 724, 366 P.3d at 646.  To overcome the 
presumption, a defendant claiming error in the denial of a mistrial motion must show “there 
is an overwhelming probability that the jury [was] unable to follow the court’s instructions 
and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence [was] devastating to the defendant.”  
Ruiz, 159 Idaho at 724-25, 366 P.3d at 646-47 (citing Hill, 140 Idaho at 631, 97 P.3d at 
1020).  Where, as here, a defendant claims a curative instruction was insufficient to remedy 
the prejudicial effect of inadmissible evidence, the appellate court’s analysis focuses not 
only on the curative instruction, but also on the “strength of the evidence” and “the 
significance of the improperly disclosed information.”  Watkins, 152 Idaho at 768, 274 
P.3d at 1283; Ruiz, 159 Idaho at 725, 366 P.3d at 647.  
 Contrary to Maldonado’s assertions on appeal, application of the above principles 
to the facts of this case shows that Nellie’s statement to Detective Marang about 
Maldonado having been in prison a long time and disliking being disrespected, though 
inadmissible, was harmless and did not necessitate a mistrial.  After the court was informed 
of the inadvertent admission and publication of Nellie’s improper comments, it 
acknowledged that they “could cause the jurors unfair prejudice” against Maldonado.  
(11/18/16, p.157, Ls.4-6.)  After much discussion and argument, the court denied 
Maldonado’s motion for a mistrial, but took the curative measures of striking the entire 
recording (St. Ex. 23) from the record and instructing the jury “to disregard anything you 
may have heard or understood from the Exhibit 23 audio recording of Nelida 
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Maldonado.”10  (11/18/16 Tr., p.175, L.25 – p.176, L.11.)  The court later instructed the 
jury that it was to “decide the facts from all the evidence presented in the case” and 
reminded it that “[c]ertain things you have heard or seen are not evidence, including … 
testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or which you have been instructed to 
disregard.”  (11/21/16 Tr., p.10, Ls.7-22.)  “Absent compelling circumstances dictating the 
opposite conclusion,” the court’s curative instructions must be deemed to have been “an 
effective remedy” for any potential prejudice occasioned by Nellie’s comment about 
“prison.”  State v. Frauenberger, 154 Idaho 294, 302, 297 P.3d 257, 265 (Ct. App. 2013) 
(citing Watkins, 152 Idaho at 767-69, 274 P.3d at 1282-84)).   
 Maldonado points out that when the prosecutor laid the foundation for subsequently 
admitting the properly redacted recording of Nellie’s interview (St. Ex. 5) into evidence, 
he asked Detective Marang, “Have you heard ‘some things’ that have ‘been taken out’[?]” 
and the detective answered “Yes.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.24 (quoting 11/18/16 Tr., p.246, 
Ls.24-25 (emphasis added).)  Based in part on that exchange, Maldonado contends that, 
“[e]ven with the district court’s instruction, the jurors were likely unable to put the 
prejudicial information out of their minds because they were reminded of it when Detective 
Marang testified about it again and when they could listen to the redacted audio of the 
interview as they deliberated.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.25.)  Maldonado’s argument that the 
prosecutor’s reference to “some things” that have “been taken out” improperly drew the 
                                            
10  In part, the trial court relied upon State v. Fluery, 123 Idaho 9, 843 P.2d 159 (Ct. App. 
1992), in which the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the measure employed by the trial 
court in curing improper (and unsolicited) testimony that Fluery’s probation officer was 
with police when Fluery was arrested; the Court approved the trial court’s striking of the 
entire testimony surrounding Fluery’s arrest with a limiting instruction.  (11/18/16 Tr., 
p.155, L.21 - p.156, L.9.)  Similar to Maldonado’s trial, the improper testimony in Fluery 
had been made inadvertently.  Fluery, 123 Idaho at 11, 843 P.2d at 161.  
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jury’s attention to Nellie’s “prison” comments is not persuasive.  In laying a foundation to 
admit State’s Exhibit 5, it was necessary for the prosecutor to show that the recording had 
been altered – i.e., that “some things” had “been taken out.”  There is nothing about that 
innocuous remark that would have made the jury disregard the trial court’s instructions 
instead of rendering a verdict based solely on the admissible evidence that overwhelmingly 
established Maldonado’s guilt. 
Indeed, Idaho appellate courts have repeatedly held that a brief reference to the 
defendant being in custody does not deprive him of a fair trial where the district court 
instructs the jury to disregard the comment.  See State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 601, 768 
P.2d 1331, 1334 (1989); State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 630-31, 97 P.3d 1014, 1019-20 (Ct. 
App. 2004).   
In Hedger, when the prosecutor asked the victim how she knew that she had locked 
her windows on the night of her attack, the victim testified that she “made double sure since 
the time [the defendant] had gotten out of jail.”  115 Idaho at 601, 768 P.2d at 1334.  The 
prosecutor then asked when the defendant “got out of jail,” and the victim testified that the 
defendant “got out of jail on a Tuesday, the Tuesday before the 9th.”  Id.  Similar to 
Maldonado’s case, the district court in Hedger struck the testimony, instructed the jury to 
disregard it, and denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial.  Id.  The Idaho Supreme 
Court held “there was no error in the trial court’s handling of the issue” because, where 
improper testimony is introduced “and the trial court promptly instructs the jury to 
disregard the evidence, it must be presumed that the jury obeyed the trial court’s direction 
entirely.”  Id.; see Hill, 140 Idaho at 631, 97 P.3d at 1020 (holding defendant had fair trial 
where prosecutor asked when witness “spoke to [the defendant] in jail” and the district 
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court “instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s question”); see also State v. 
Harrison, 136 Idaho 504, 507, 37 P.3d 1, 4 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding prosecutor’s references 
to defendant’s “custody status” did not affect the outcome of the trial even where the 
district court did not instruct the jury to disregard all of the references).  
Even if the curative instruction is not itself determinative, this Court can 
nevertheless easily conclude the stricken testimony was harmless because the state 
presented overwhelming evidence of Maldonado’s guilt.  Watkins, 152 Idaho at 768, 274 
P.3d at 1283; Ruiz, 159 Idaho at 725, 366 P.3d at 647.  As demonstrated above, the state’s 
evidence showing that Maldonado was the person who battered Nellie and caused her to 
suffer traumatic injury was not just compelling, it was overwhelming.  For the reasons set 
forth in Section I.D., supra (regarding harmless error), and relied upon here, the state’s 
evidence convincingly showed that Maldonado was guilty of felony domestic battery.   
Considering the strength of the evidence and the trial court’s curative instructions, 
there is no reasonable possibility that the stricken statement by Nellie regarding Maldonado 
having been in prison contributed to the jury’s verdict.  Maldonado has failed to show the 
trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. 
  
III. 
Maldonado Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error 
 
 Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in themselves, 
may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.  State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 
453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994).  A necessary predicate to application of the doctrine is a 
finding of more than one error.  State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 
1998).    
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Maldonado has failed to show that two or more errors occurred in his trial, and 
therefore the doctrine is inapplicable to this case.  See, e.g., LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 
115, 121, 937 P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997).  Even if errors in the trial had been shown, 
they would not amount to a denial of due process that would require reversal.  State v. 
Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 
191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (accumulation of errors deemed harmless). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Maldonado’s judgment of 
conviction. 
 DATED this 5th day of April, 2018. 
 
 /s/ John C. McKinney__________________ 
      JOHN C. McKINNEY 
Deputy Attorney General 
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